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Introduction
Labor issues were a major point of contention during the recent free
trade negotiations between the United States and South Korea.' The
nation's largest labor organization, the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), joined by its allies in
Congress, opposed the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement ("KORUS
FTA"), due to concerns over anticipated American job losses, as well as
inadequate labor protections in the agreement.2 The United States negoti-
ated the KORUS FTA under a procedure known as "fast track."3 Under fast
track, Congress suspends its usual legislative procedures when considering
a free trade agreement ("FTA"), instead limiting debate, allowing no amend-
ments, and requiring a simple up and down vote.4 Although fast track
controls the procedural handling of trade legislation, not the contents of
the bill, the association of free trade agreements with fast track has caused
pro-labor groups and their supporters in Congress to consistently oppose
renewal of the President's fast track authority.5 Labor advocates blame
FTAs not only for job losses in the United States,6 but also for encouraging
a "race to the bottom" among our international trading partners. 7 They
1. See Aaron E. Lorenzo, Daniel Pruzin, & Amy Tsui, Disappointment, Hope, Criti-
cisms Mark U.S. Business Reaction to Failed Korea Talks, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 18,
2010), http://www.bna.com/itr/arch573.htm.
2. See Sewell Chan, Obama Presses to Complete Free-Trade Deal With South Korea,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, at B4. In October 2010, twenty House members sent a letter to
Obama calling for stronger labor standards in the U.S.-Korea FTA, echoing concerns
raised by the AFL-CIO. Id. In a rare exception, the United Autoworkers Union ("UAW")
broke ranks with other American unions and supported the KORUS FTA. See John
Maggs, UAW Under Fire for Trade Deal Support, POLITICO (Dec. 6, 2010, 4:54 PM), http://
www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?articlel8642 (Dec. 6, 2010); see also infra Part V.
3. See USTR Examining Side Letter Legal Implications For Korea FTA Changes,
WORLD TRADE ONLINE (July 23, 2010), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-
U.S.-Trade-07/23/2010/ustr-examining-side-letter-legal-implications-for-korea-fta-
changes/menu-id-710.html. All United States' FTAs have been negotiated under fast
track, except for the Jordan FTA. See J. F. HORNBECK & WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CON-
GRESS IN TRADE POLICY 11 (Nov. 4, 2010).
4. For a full enumeration of Congressional and Presidential actions under Fast
Track, see HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 17-18; 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d), (e)(1),
(0(1)-(2), (g)(1) -(2) (2006).
5. See Kara Rowland, Obama's Free-Trade Goal Hits Roadblock, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
18, 2010, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/18/obamas-
free-trade-goal-hits-roadblock/.
6. See Mike Hall, Pennsylvania House Calls on Congress to Defeat Fast Track Renewal,
AFL-CIO Now BLOG (MAY 24, 2007), http://blog.aflcio.org/2007/05/24/pennsylvania-
house-calls-on-congress-to-defeat-fast-track-renewal. Since H. Ross Perot claimed during
the 1991 presidential debates that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was causing a "giant sucking sound" ofjobs leaving the U.S., FTAs have been associated
with American job loss. See Ross Perot, Presidential Candidate, Debating our Destiny: The
Third 1992 Presidential Debate, (Oct. 19, 1992), available at http://www.pbs.org/new-
shour/debatingourdestiny/92debates/3prez2.html.
7. See Charles B. Rangel, Moving Forward: A New, Bipartisan Trade Policy That
Reflects American Values, 45 HARvARD J. ON LEGIS. 377, 394 (2008). The WTO defines
the "race to the bottom" as a lowering of standards in order to gain unfair economic
advantage. World Trade Organization, Labour Standards: Consensus, Coherence and Con-
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contend that, although FTAs include some delineation of labor standards,
the standards are weak and unenforceable. 8
Fast track authority, also known as trade promotion authority ("TPA"),
expired in 2007.9 The only FTA that has been implemented since then is
the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement ("Peru FTA"), which had already been
completed prior to the expiration of TPA. 10 Prior to approving the Peru
FTA, Congress incorporated language into the agreement that reflected its
"New Trade Policy for America" ("New Trade Policy")." The New Trade
Policy contained four enforceable labor provisions designed to protect the
interests of both American and international workers. 12 Congress man-
dated that all future FTAs would be required to include template language
from the New Trade Policy to ensure that core labor standards were admin-
istered and enforced in the signatory countries.' 3 Former Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi, in a nod to the New Trade Policy labor provisions,
specifically attributed her vote in favor of the Peru FTA to the fact that the
agreement included requirements for worker protections that were "a 'dras-
tic difference' from other trade pacts."' 4 With the new language providing
for enforceable labor standards required in all trade agreements, labor
advocates could be satisfied that they finally had the protection for both
domestic and international workers, which they believed prior fast tracked
agreements lacked.
The final version of the KORUS FTA included the New Trade Policy
troversy, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/bey5_e.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2010).
8. See Rangel, supra note 7, at 390-91.
9. HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 1.
10. See generally United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-138 (2007). The FTA had been approved by the Peruvian Congress
in 2006 and was awaiting U.S. congressional fast-track approval when TPA expired. M.
ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22391, U.S.-PERu TRADE PROMOTION
AGREEMENT 5 (Mar. 7, 2007). In addition to the Peru FTA, negotiations were completed
on FTAs with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea when TPA expired. MARY JANE BOLLE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22823, OVERVIEW OF LABOR ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS 4 (Feb. 29, 2008). [hereinafter BOLLE RS 22823].
11. See infra Part III for a discussion of the New Trade Policy.
12. The New Trade Policy includes:
A fully enforceable commitment that FTA countries will adopt, maintain and
enforce in their laws and practice the five basic international labor standards, as
stated in the 1998 International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work.
A new, fully enforceable, binding commitment prohibiting FTA countries from
lowering labor standards.
New limitations on "prosecutorial" and "enforcement" discretion - FTA coun-
tries cannot defend the failure to enforce laws related to the five basic standards
due to resource limitations or decisions to prioritize other enforcement issues.
Same dispute settlement mechanisms/penalties as other FTA obligations.
A New Trade Policy for America, http://www.cpath.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilder
files/newtradepolicyoutline5-10-07.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2011).
13. See M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS
22521, PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT: LABOR ISSUES 5 (Oct. 23, 2006).
14. Richard Simon, Free-Trade Deal Divides Democrats, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/09/nation/na-trade 9 .
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template. 15 Nevertheless, as noted above, unsatisfied with its labor protec-
tions, organized labor and its congressional allies still opposed the agree-
ment.16  Fortunately for the Obama Administration, Congress will
consider the KORUS FTA under fast track procedures because, like the
Peru FTA, the original KORUS negotiations took place prior to TPA's expi-
ration in 2007.17 Supporters of the KORUS FTA believe the ability to use
fast track will be a major factor in getting the contentious FTA passed, since
labor advocates will not have the floors of Congress to reopen their objec-
tions to the agreement.1 8 In fact, most trade experts maintain that without
renewed fast track authority, the President will find it impossible to get any
future trade agreement through Congress. 19
This Note argues that using fast track procedures does not diminish
labor protections in free trade agreements. Part I examines the evolution of
fast track, detailing its legislative history and outlining fast track proce-
dures. Part II discusses the means by which the United States enters into
international agreements, examining the impact of fast track procedures on
the powers of the President and Congress. Part III examines the four main
methods used to insert labor protection into FTAs and examines differ-
ences in standards and enforcement mechanisms in the different models.
Part IV looks at the role of the International Labor Organization ("ILO")
and World Trade Organization ("WTO") in matters involving international
trade and worker protections, noting the New Trade Policy's requirement
for FTA conformance with the ILO's Declaration on Workers' Rights. Part
V argues that fast track is not an impediment to achieving the worker pro-
tections that labor proponents seek. I advocate that fast track authority
should be renewed, so that the United States can expand its export markets
and create new jobs. In Part V, I also suggest that there may be more effec-
tive ways to promote labor standards than through fast tracked FTAs.
I. Fast Track Authority
A. Background
Fast track has been the means by which the United States has imple-
15. See WILLIAM H. COOPER & MARK E. MANYIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33435,
THE PROPOSED SOUTH KOREA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (KORUS FTA) 5 (July 18,
2007).
16. See Chan, supra note 2.
17. See HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 1. Although Congress never approved
the FTA with South Korea, the U.S. originally negotiated and signed it prior to the expi-
ration of TPA in 2007. USTR Examining Side Letter Legal Implications For Korea FTA
Changes, supra note 3.
18. See USTR Examining Side Letter Legal Implications For Korea FTA Changes, supra
note 3.
19. "[E]xtensive revisions to the text may lead the other party to abandon the agree-
ment altogether. Furthermore, a cumbersome and time-consuming process for conclud-
ing executive agreements may serve as a disincentive to enter into negotiations with the
United States in the first place." Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International
Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE LJ. 140, 243 (2009).
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mented trade agreements since passage of the Trade Act of 1974.20 When
Congress granted fast track authority to the President in 1974, it did so in
recognition of the fact that America's trading partners would not want to
engage in lengthy negotiations that could then be undone by Congress.
2 1
U.S. negotiating credibility had been seriously injured as a result of unau-
thorized agreements that the Administration made during talks on the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 22 during the 1960s Ken-
nedy Round.23 Congress concluded that the President had overstepped his
negotiating authority in two areas of the GATT agreement, and subse-
quently, Congress did not pass legislation to implement those two provi-
sions. 24 With the President's negotiating authority codified under fast
track, trading partners have the security that Congress will approve what
the Administration agrees to at the bargaining table, something most trade
experts believe other countries expect from the negotiation process.
25
Having fast track in place also gives Congress an added measure of
control in ensuring its interests are being met during negotiations, as it
prevents the President from exceeding his authority.26 Since each piece of
legislation authorizing fast track includes specific negotiating objectives,
the Administration knows it must operate within certain parameters.
2 7
Another benefit Congress derives from fast track is the ability to sidestep
its own often cumbersome procedures for bringing a bill to a vote. 28 Legis-
lation can languish for months or even years as Congress debates not only
the merits of a bill, but also procedural protocols that may have nothing to
do with the substance of the legislation itself.2 9 Fast track procedures also
prevent trade bills from getting bogged down, or killed altogether, as spe-
cial interest groups exert pressure on legislators for lengthy amendments to
trade bills.30 Labor groups, in particular, have been very vocal against free
trade agreements, and they have lobbied their legislators for worker protec-
20. HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 4-5; 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2006).
21. HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 5.
22. GATT largely regulated the world's trading system after World War II. GATT was
later replaced by the World Trade Organization. See World Trade Organization, Under-
standing the WTO - The Uruguay Round, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_
e/tif-e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
23. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 143, 146 n.8 (1992); LENORE SEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB 10084, TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS): BACKGROUND
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 107TH CONGRESS 2 (Jan. 14, 2003).
24. See SEK, supra note 23, at 2.
25. See ROBERT E. BALDWIN & CHRISTOPHER S. MAGEE, CONGRESSIONAL TRADE VOTES:
FROM NAFTA APPROVAL TO FAST-TRACK DEFEAT 2 (Institute for International Economics
2000).
26. See Hathaway, supra note 19, at 260-62.
27. See HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 8.
28. See Koh, supra note 23, at 148.
29. See Craig VanGrasstek, U.S. Trade Promotion Authority and the Doha Round, INT'L
CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. 3 (Info. Note No. 3, Feb. 2008).
30. See id. at 2; see also Koh, supra note 23, at 148.
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tions at every opportunity. 3 1
B. Fast Track Procedures
The fast track procedures enacted in the Trade Act of 1974 remained
virtually intact throughout the life of fast track.3 2 The procedures called
for (1) enumeration of specific trade negotiating objectives for a trade
agreement, (2) requirements for the President's negotiators, such as consul-
tation with congressional and private sector committees during negotia-
tions, (3) rules and timelines for the President to submit the agreement and
draft implementing bill to Congress, and (4) commitments by Congress to
follow a timeline for considering the implementing bill and bringing it to a
vote.
33
Under fast track, Congress agrees to suspend its usual legislative pro-
cedures when considering trade implementing legislation. 34 Instead of fol-
lowing their ordinary timelines and procedures, under fast track, the
House and Senate must each complete its review of trade legislation in
forty-five days. 35 Debate is subject to strict time limits of no more than
twenty hours in the House or Senate, and no amendments to the legislation
are allowed. 36 Passage of the bill requires a simple up or down vote.3 7 In
return for Congress's suspension of its usual rules, the Administration
must give Congress ninety days notice of its intention to begin negotiations
of a trade agreement, keep Congress advised in a specified manner as nego-
tiations proceed, and provide notification to Congress ninety days prior to
signing the completed agreement, so that Congress can provide input on
the bill before the bill is finalized and brought to a vote. 38 In particular,
negotiators must consult with the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee, as well as the Congressional Oversight
Group that was created in the Trade Act of 2002.3 9
31. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Executive Council Statement, Fast Track or the Right Track?
(Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/
ec03062007c.cfm; Rowland, supra note 5.
32. See I.M. DESTER, RENEWING FAST-TRAcK LEGISLATION 7 (Institute for International
Economics 1997) [hereinafter DESTLER 1997]; Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2101-2497(b).
33. DESTLER 1997, supra note 32, at 7-8.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(f)(1), (g)(1) (2006). Since Congress has decided that trade
agreements are not "self-executing," implementing legislation is necessary to make
changes to U.S. law so that it conforms with the provisions of the FTA. See I.M. (Mac)
Destler, American Trade Politics in 2007: Building Bipartisan Compromise, PETERSON INST.
INT'L EcON. 15 (May 2007), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb07-5.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Destler 2007].
35. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e)(1).
36. Id. § 2191(d), (f)(2), (g)(2).
37. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 264.
38. HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 11, 17-18. For a full enumeration of the
timeline for Administration and Presidential actions under Fast Track, see id.
39. Id. at 10.
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C. Legislative History of Fast Track
Fast track authority was in effect from 1974 through 1994 and was
renewed again in 2002.40 It expired in 2007 and Congress has not
extended it since. 4 1
1. The Trade Act of 1974
Before the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, multilateral trade agree-
ments over tariff reductions did not require congressional approval,
although Congress did set some limits on the types of reductions permit-
ted.42 However, in 1974, when the President's authority was extended to
negotiate non-tariff barriers as well, Congress decided to add the require-
ment for congressional approval of any multilateral agreements that
included non-tariff issues.4 3 As noted previously, during trade negotia-
tions in the 1960s Kennedy Round, U.S. negotiators impermissibly made
agreements concerning non-tariff barriers that Congress subsequently
refused to approve.4 4 To restore confidence in the credibility of American
negotiators and to give them the power necessary to address issues beyond
tariff changes in subsequent negotiations, the Nixon Administration and
Congress came up with a new way of handling the passage of trade agree-
ments, an arrangement that became known as fast track authority.4 5 Fast
track was enacted in the Trade Act of 1974 for a five-year period ending on
January 2, 1980.46 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 extended fast track
authority for eight more years.4 7 The Tariff and Trade Act of 1984 again
amended the Trade Act of 1974, this time extending the authority for nego-
tiation of non-tariff barriers in multilateral FTAs to also include the negoti-
ation of bilateral FTAs. 4 8 The U.S.-Israel and U.S.-Canada FTAs were
negotiated under the 1984 Trade Act.
49
2. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("OTCA")
The OTCA extended fast track procedures for agreements entered into
before June 1, 1991.50 Congress later granted the President permission to
enter into trade agreements before June 1, 1993, but the President would
40. Id. at 7.
41. Id. at 1.
42. Congress prohibited certain products from duty cuts, limited levels of duty
reduction, and required that implementation of significant duty cuts be gradual. BALD-
WIN & MAGEE, supra note 25, at 11.
43. See id.
44. See SEK, supra note 23, at 2.
45. See id. at 2-3.
46. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2497(b).
47. E.g., CAROLYN C. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21004, TRADE PROMOTION
AuTHOmRTY AND FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATING AuTHORIT FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS: MAJOR VOTES
2 (July 17, 2007); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (2006).
48. HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 6; Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948.
49. HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 6.
50. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107.
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have to ask for a specific extension of fast track authority for the imple-
menting legislation to be considered under fast track.5 ' NAFTA passed
under the OTCA as Public Law 103-182.52 Since the OTCA, labor stan-
dards have been included as negotiating objectives under fast track provi-
sions.5 3 Although both the Clinton Administration and Republican
Congress claimed to want a renewal of fast track, they were unable to agree
on how labor and environmental issues should be handled in trade agree-
ments.54 As a result, fast track authority was not reauthorized and expired
on April 16, 1994. 55
3. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002
Fast track authority was granted again in Title XXI of the Trade Act of
2002.56 To avoid the negativity associated with the term "fast track," when
President Bush sought renewed authority in 2001, fast track was renamed
"trade promotion authority" ("TPA").5 7 Although fast track was renamed
TPA, the structure of the negotiating authority remained the same. 5 8 The
TPA included labor provisions in both the principal and overall negotiating
objectives, but did not require inclusion of minimal enforceable labor stan-
dards in the FTA.5 9 Labor groups and many members of Congress
opposed the TPA because of this lack of labor standards.60 The TPA passed
in the House by just one vote. 6 1 The narrow margin of support by which
fast track passed in 2002 helps explain why Congress decided not to
extend TPA when it expired in 2007.62 Congress had continuing concerns
over FTAs, most of which were tied to the sagging economy and globaliza-
tion.6 3 Democrats were particularly concerned over the loss of U.S. manu-
facturing jobs-something that the party's labor support base continues to
attribute to the job exodus since passing NAFTA. 64
Under the 2002 TPA, the Administration negotiated free trade agree-
ments with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, and the
51. Id.
52. NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994. North American Free Trade Agree-
ment Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-82, 107 Stat. 785.
53. See MARYJANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33864, Trade Promotion Author-
ity (TPA) Renewal: Core Labor Standards Issues 9-10 (June 13, 2007) [hereinafter BOLLE
RL 33864].
54. See id. at 6 (discussing bipartisan efforts in trade agreements and legislation).
55. See id.
56. Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3813 (2010).
57. HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 7.
58. Id.
59. See id.; Robert A. Rogowsky & Eric Chyn, U.S. Trade Law and FTAs: A Survey of
Labor Requirements, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'NJ. INT'L COM. & EcON. 1, 7-8 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/trade law ftas.pdf.
60. HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 7.
61. See Rangel, supra note 7, at 381 n.31.
62. See id. at 387.
63. See HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 15.
64. See Andrew C. Schneider, Democrats Threaten NAFTA, but Pact Is Here to Stay,
KIPLINGER, Apr. 3, 2008, http://www.kiptinger.com/businessresource/forecast/archive/
nafta and-political candidates_080403 .html.
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Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, all of which
passed through Congress under fast track procedures.65 Prior to expira-
tion of TPA on July 1, 2007, the U.S. signed free trade agreements with
Colombia, Peru, Panama, and South Korea, but Congress has only
approved implementing legislation for the U.S.-Peru FTA.66
11. U.S. Procedure for International Agreements
The President does not require fast track authority to negotiate a free
trade agreement.6 7 As discussed in Part I, fast track is simply an expedited
procedure that provides assurance to America's trading partners that a
negotiated agreement will make it through Congress expeditiously and
without change.68 There are several other ways that the President can enter
into international trade agreements, including Article II treaties, sole execu-
tive agreements, and congressional-executive agreements. 69
A. Presidential Role in International Agreements
Article II, Section 2, of the United States Constitution grants the Presi-
dent the power to make an international treaty, but the Senate must then
approve the agreement by a two-thirds supermajority vote.70 An exception
arises in cases where a treaty itself authorizes subsequent agreements,
allowing the President to unilaterally make those agreements without fur-
ther approval from the Senate. 7 1 There are also "sole executive agreements"
that the President makes based on his inherent constitutional authority,
including his power as Commander-in-Chief of the military. 7 2 Most agree-
ments take the form of "ex ante congressional-executive agreements" where
Congress, through a simple majority vote in both Houses, authorizes the
President to negotiate international agreements. 73 Once negotiated, these
ex ante congressional-executive agreements are not subject to further con-
gressional approval.7 4 There are also "ex post congressional-executive
agreements" that the President negotiates and then submits to both houses
of Congress for an up or down vote. 75
B. Presidential Authority to Negotiate FTAs
U.S. trade agreements such as NAFTA and KORUS have been treated
65. E.g., JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-896, WHY CERTAIN TRADE
AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN AS
TREATIES 4 (Sept. 8, 2010).
66. HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 7.
67. BALDWIN & MAGEE, supra note 25, at 2.
68. See supra Part I; see also BALDWIN & MAGEE, supra note 25, at 2.
69. See Hathaway, supra note 19, at 148-49.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
71. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (Thomson/West
2006). This is known as a "treaty-based executive agreement." Id.
72. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 149, 154.
73. Id. at 149.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 148-49.
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as congressional-executive agreements rather than as treaties.76 Since the
"Constitution grants Congress primary jurisdiction over 'commerce with
foreign nations[,"' some have questioned whether giving the President the
right to negotiate free trade agreements under fast track gives the executive
branch more power than that which the law entitles it.77 On the one hand,
the President has Article II authority to negotiate treaties and international
agreements and to conduct foreign affairs. 78 On the other hand, Congress
has the express power to impose duties and tariffs and to regulate foreign
commerce. 79 However, even though Congress has express power in tariff
matters, it can still delegate this authority to the President.80 In a judicial
challenge to NAFTA, it was alleged that the President's failure to use the
treaty process rendered NAFTA and its implementing legislation unconsti-
tutional. 8 1 However, in Made in the USA Foundation v. United States,82 a
federal appeals court held that whether international commercial agree-
ments could be passed via an executive agreement, as opposed to a treaty,
was a non-justiciable political question.83 Consequently, free trade agree-
ments continue to be handled as congressional-executive agreements.84
C. Congressional Role in Free Trade Agreements
Professor Oona A. Hathaway of Yale Law School argues that fast track
(ex post congressional-executive) agreements are actually "more democrati-
cally legitimate" than others, since Article II treaties remove the House of
Representatives from the lawmaking process and, with ex ante agreements,
Congress hands over its power in advance-giving Congress little involve-
ment in the final product.85 By contrast, fast track agreements require the
President to consult with Congress and to consider Congress's agenda dur-
ing the entire negotiation process, since Congress has the ultimate power to
vote the completed agreement up or down.86 Congress can exert its
authority over trade negotiations through several means, such as deciding
which types of negotiations go forward, establishing what statutory guide-
lines should be used for negotiations, and consulting with the executive
branch during the negotiating process to ensure that the implementing bill
76. See GRIMMETT, supra note 65, at 1 n.1.
77. DESTLER 1997, supra note 32, at 33-34. See generally Hathaway, supra note 19,
for a discussion of the proper roles of the President and Congress in making interna-
tional agreements.
78. See GRIMMETT, supra note 65, at 1 n.1 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 319 (1936)).
79. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 3).
80. See id. at 2 n.2.
81. See id. at 5.
82. See 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001).
83. See GRIMMETY, supra note 65, at 6. Under the "political question" doctrine, a
court will not make a ruling regarding political matters which are best left to the execu-
tive and legislative branches. See id.
84. See id. at 1.
85. Hathaway, supra note 19, at 261.
86. See id. at 261-62.
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will reflect Congress's interests.8 7
Perhaps the most important tool that Congress has for controlling the
contents of trade agreements negotiated under fast track authority is its
ability to set negotiating objectives within the TPA legislation.8 8 Although
the Executive Branch has some discretion over how it implements the
objectives that Congress sets, the objectives are considered "definitive state-
ments of U.S. trade policy" and the Administration is expected to abide by
them if it wants to use fast track procedures. 8 9
There are different categories of negotiating objectives. "Overall objec-
tives" provide the general direction that trade negotiations are expected to
take, such as improving the American economy. 90 "Principal objectives"
provide more detailed goals that Congress wants to accomplish in trade
negotiations, such as reducing specific trade barriers or promoting labor
rights. 9 1 Using the Trade Act of 2002 as an example, in its overall trade
negotiating objectives, the Act expressed several goals pertaining to labor,
such as raising living standards, promoting full employment in the United
States, promoting respect for worker rights, and having signatory parties
"strive to ensure" that they do not reduce labor protection to encourage
trade. 92 In its principal negotiating objectives for labor, the Trade Act of
2002 specified the inclusion of provisions to ensure that a party does not
fail to "effectively" enforce its labor laws and to strengthen the capacity of
U.S. trading partners to respect core labor standards. 93
Because the language written into a free trade agreement so closely
resembles the objectives set forth in the actual fast track legislation, Con-
gress's choice of specific words in the TPA to describe the negotiating
objectives has often been extremely contentious and is blamed, in part, for
the controversy over renewal of the TPA in 2002.9 4 The congressional vote
on whether to renew fast track authority is among the most critical trade
votes that Congress makes, and it is also one of the most political, which
explains why TPA legislation has not only passed so narrowly, but has also
done so along partisan lines.95 In 2002, for example, reauthorization of
fast track authority passed the House by a margin of a single vote, with
only seven Democrats voting in favor of the bill.9 6
III. Labor Protection in Free Trade Agreements
Labor provisions were not included in the first two fast track FTAs
87. See DESTLER 1997, supra note 32, at 34.
88. See HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 8.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(a)(4), (6), (7) (2002).
93. Id. § 3802(b)(11)(A), (C).
94. See HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 8-9.
95. See id.; Rangel, supra note 7, at 381-82.
96. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3813 (2002); Rangel, supra note 7, at 381 n.31.
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with Israel and Canada. 97 However, starting with NAFTA, all FTAs have
contained labor standards, as the United States has entered into negotia-
tions with lesser-developed countries, and labor and trade policies have
been increasingly linked.98 Those seeking to include enforceable labor
standards in FTAs have mixed goals. 99 On one hand, labor advocates have
economic interests, and they want to protect American jobs by ensuring
that American workers are not at a disadvantage when competing with
workers overseas. 10 0 Developing countries competing for market share
may impose low wages and poor working conditions in order to produce
low-priced goods for export. 10 1 Other proponents of labor standards have
a more humanitarian objective, however, and seek to promote improved
working conditions for laborers around the world by ensuring that U.S.
trading partners enforce minimum labor standards.
10 2
The United States has implemented ten FTAs since 1993, including
NAFTA, Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman,
CAFTA-DR, 10 3 and Peru. 10 4 These FTAs have used four main methods to
provide labor protections.1 0 5 NAFTA, negotiated under fast track author-
ity, utilized a side agreement on labor. 10 6 For the Jordan FTA, which was
not subject to fast track, a number of labor requirements were written into
the body of the agreement. 10 7 The FTAs negotiated under the Trade Act of
2002's fast track authority included a single enforceable labor provision
within the agreement. 10 8 Finally, the Peru FTA, which was negotiated
under fast track but implemented after its expiration, incorporated enforce-
able labor concepts derived from the New Trade Policy for America. 10 9
This Part will examine the differences in protections and enforcement
mechanisms in the four models.
A. NAFTA Side Agreement
The NAFTA agreement itself did not include labor provisions, but a
side agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
("NAALC") addressed labor provisions. 1 10 As stated in Article I of the
NAALC, the objectives of the Agreement are to:
97. BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 2.
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., BOLLE RL 33864, supra note 53, at 3.
100. See id.
101. See Edward Gresser, Labor and Environment in Trade Since NAFTA: Activists Have
Achieved Less, and More, Than They Realize, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 491, 515 (2010).
102. See BOLLE RL 33864, supra note 53, at 3.
103. Similar to NAFTA, CAFTA-DR is a regional agreement. It includes the Domini-
can Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
104. E.g., BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 3.
105. See id. at 3-4.
106. See id. at 3.
107. See Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 59, at 8.
108. BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 3.
109. See Gresser, supra note 101, at 497.
110. BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 3.
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(a) improve working conditions and living standards in each Party's
territory;
(b) promote, to the maximum extent possible, the labor principles set out
in Annex 1;
(c) encourage cooperation to promote innovation and rising levels of
productivity and quality;
(d) encourage publication and exchange of information, data development
and coordination, and joint studies to enhance mutually beneficial
understanding of the laws and institutions governing labor in each
Party's territory;
(e) pursue cooperative labor-related activities on the basis of mutual
benefit;
(f) promote compliance with, and effective enforcement by each Party of,
its labor law; and
(g) foster transparency in the administration of labor law."'
Annex 1 to the NAALC further listed "guiding principles" for workers
that the three signatory countries committed themselves to upholding.' 1 2
While each country agreed to promote the labor principles listed in the
Annex, "subject to each [p]arty's domestic law," the NAALC specified that
the principles "did not establish common minimum standards for their
domestic law."'113 Each nation maintained sovereignty over its own labor
laws. 11
4
The labor principles delineated in Annex 1 are listed below:
1. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize.
2. The right to bargain collectively.
3. The right to strike.
4. Prohibition of forced labor.
5. Labor protections for children and young persons.
6. Minimum employment standards.
7. Elimination of employment discrimination.
8. Equal pay for women and men.
9. Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses.
10. Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses.
11. Protection of migrant workers.1
15
Only three of these principles were made enforceable by sanctions:
labor protections for children, occupational safety and health standards,
and minimum wage employment standards. 116 There were no sanctions
specified for a country's failure to enforce its own laws relating to organiz-
ing and collective bargaining, both of which labor advocates consider
111. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1, 9 1,
Sept.14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC], available at http://actrav.itcilo.org/
actrav-english/teleam/global/ilo/blokit/naalcl .htm.
112. Id. at Annex 1: LABOR PRINCIPLES, available at http://new.naalc.org/index.cfm
?page=219.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. Id.; North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 13, 1993, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3473.
116. See Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 59, at 7; see also NAALC, supra note 111, art.
29.
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"basic core labor rights."117 In contrast, NAFTA itself made all of the provi-
sions relating to commercial issues fully enforceable."i 8 Further, the
NAALC places maximum limits on monetary enforcement assessments,
while NAFTA places no cap on penalties for commercial compliance
violations. 119
If one of the signatories to the NAALC believes another is "demon-
strating a persistent pattern of failure" to enforce the enumerated labor
principles, a dispute resolution process is available. 120 Only governments
have authority in the dispute resolution process, as NAALC procedures
require private organizations and other non-governmental entities to pur-
sue labor complaints through the government of one of the signatory
nations. 12 1 Because governments are unlikely to take punitive action
against another government for fear of retaliation, labor champions con-
sider the NAALC mechanism for enforcement to be very ineffective. 122
NAALC's lack of enforcement teeth is evidenced by the fact that no govern-
ment has ever brought a claim against another government under the
NAALC. 12 3
B. Jordan Free Trade Agreement
The Jordan FTA, signed on October 24, 2000, was the first free trade
agreement to incorporate labor provisions within the actual body of the
FTA.124 The Jordan FTA was not negotiated under fast track procedures, as
the authority had expired.1 25 Article 6 of the Jordan FTA was devoted to
labor issues. 126 In this Article, both countries reaffirmed their obligations
as members of the International Labor Organization ("ILO") 12 7 and agreed
not to promote trade by diminishing domestic labor laws.128 In addition,
Jordan and the U.S. recognized that each nation had the right to establish
its own domestic labor standards. 12 9 Enforcement was specifically
addressed in Article 6, Subpart 4, as follows:
Article 6: Labor
117. BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.S. NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS,
NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION: A GUIDE (U.S. Dept. of Labor
2005), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/naalcgd.htm#Dispute
Resolution.
121. See Frank H. Bieszczat, Labor Provisions in Trade Agreements: From the NAALC to
Now, 83 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1387, 1394 (2008).
122. See id. at 1395.
123. See id.
124. Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 59, at 8.
125. Id.
126. See generally Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000,
available at http://www.ustraderep.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset
.upload file2505112.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA].
127. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the ILO.
128. U.S.-JordanFTA. art. 6 §§ 1-2.
129. Id. § 3.
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4. (a) A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting
trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
(b) The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise
discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and com-
pliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources
to enforcement with respect to other labor matters determined to have
higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand that a Party is in com-
pliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of action or inaction reflects a
reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision
regarding the allocation of resources.
130
Although labor advocates hailed the Jordan FTA for including enforce-
ment provisions directly in the agreement, requiring a country to "effec-
tively enforce its labor laws" was not a particularly strong mandate,
especially when a country could deem that other matters had a higher pri-
ority than labor, without suffering any penalty.
13 1
Similarly, while the labor community praised the Jordan FTA for pro-
viding dispute resolution procedures and sanctions that equally applied to
both the labor and commercial provisions of the agreement, these mecha-
nisms also proved ineffective. 13 2 Initially, labor advocates believed that the
equivalent procedures would make the enforcement of labor standards
stronger than in prior FTAs.13 3 However, in reality, the Jordan agreement
turned out to have the same "soft obligations" as previous FTAs.
134
Although the agreement spelled out the dispute resolution procedure,
before the FTA was presented to Congress, United States Trade Representa-
tive ("USTR") Robert Zoellick andJordanian Ambassador Marwan Muasher
exchanged letters stating that their governments would resolve any poten-
tial disputes without resorting to trade sanctions. 135 The letters reportedly
stated the countries "would not expect or intend to apply the Agreement's
dispute settlement enforcement procedures to secure its rights under the
Agreement in a manner that results in blocking trade." 136 The Jordan FTA
provided comparable treatment for labor and commercial disputes, but
enforcement efforts were clearly designed to be limited, much to the dis-
may of labor proponents.
13 7
C. Trade Agreements under the Trade Act of 2002
Under the fast track authority granted in the Trade Act of 2002, the
United States implemented FTAs with Singapore, Chile, Australia,
Morocco, the six CAFTA-DR countries (Costa Rica, the Dominican Repub-
lic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), Bahrain, and
130. Id. art. 6.
131. See id. § 4.
132. See id. art. 17; Rangel, supra note 7, at 392.
133. See Rangel, supra note 7, at 392.
134. See id.
135. BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 3-4.
136. BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 4 n.5 (citing Jordan Free Trade Agreement
Approved by Finance and Ways and Means, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 27, 2001).
137. See id. at 3-4.
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Oman.138 The provisions of these agreements all followed the framework
and objectives established by Congress under the 2002 Act. 13 9 As dis-
cussed in Part II, Congress established both overall and principal objectives
for promoting labor rights in the Trade Act of 2002.140 One of the princi-
pal objectives for the United States with respect to labor was for the signa-
tory countries to "strive to ensure" that they do not weaken or reduce labor
protections to encourage trade.141 However, principal negotiating objective
11(B), in a nod to principles of national sovereignty, essentially left the
enforcement of labor standards in the hands of each country based on the
country's discretion and assessment of national priorities, with a promise
of no retaliation for "reasonable" decisions. 14 2 The labor provisions in the
2002 TPA followed the same general format and shared much of the same
language as those set forth in the Jordan FTA. 14 3
The Singapore FTA, which was the first negotiated under the 2002 fast
track authority, included labor provisions that reflected the growing atten-
tion to labor in American trade policy. 1 4 4 The chapter on labor was three
and a half pages long as compared to the half dozen paragraphs on labor
contained in the Jordan FTA. 14 5 However, the extra space devoted to dis-
cussion of labor principles did not in any way enhance the enforcement
provisions set out as objectives in the Trade Act of 2002.146 Article 17.2 of
the Singapore FTA, mirroring the 2002 TPA, simply required that each
party "not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws," and again allowed "that
each [p]arty retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investi-
gatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make
decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect
to other labor matters determined to have higher priorities."'14 7 As former
House Committee on Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel noted,
"[E]ach party is merely required to 'effectively enforce' its own labor laws,
whatever they may be." 14 8
Rangel consistently has maintained that the FTAs negotiated under
the 2002 fast track authority "did little more than pay lip service to labor
rights."i 4 9 Besides questionable enforcement standards, the FTAs made
limited remedies available for labor violations, capped at $15 million, while
there were no monetary limits on penalties for violations of other provi-
sions of the agreements. 150 Additionally, while violations that were not
138. E.g., Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 59, at 8.
139. Id. at 7.
140. See supra Part II; 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3813 (2002).
141. Id. § 3802(a)(7).
142. See id. § 3802(b)(11)(B).
143. See Gresser, supra note 101, at 496.
144. See Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 59, at 9.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 10.
147. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 17.2, May 6, 2003, available
at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/usa-singapore/text e.asp#CHAPTER%2017.
148. Rangel, supra note 7, at 391.
149. Id.
150. See id; BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 5.
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related to labor could result in suspension of a trading partner's benefits
under the FTA, labor violations were not subject to the same treatment.15 1
D. New Trade Policy for America
The New Trade Policy for America, agreed upon on May 10, 2007,
included four enforceable labor provisions. 15 2 These requirements were
(1) parties to FTAs would adopt and maintain in their laws and practices
the labor standards in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work ("ILO Declaration"), (2) FTA countries would not lower
their labor standards, (3) discretion on "prosecutorial" and "enforcement"
priority would have limitations, and (4) the same dispute settlement mech-
anisms and penalties would be available for labor as for other FTA obliga-
tions (such as commercial interests).15 3 The New Trade Policy terms were
designed to be inserted into free trade agreements as "template lan-
guage."' 15 4 Much in the way that the language of negotiating objectives was
agreed upon for fast track authority and inserted into the relevant FTAs,
the language eventually used as the New Trade Policy template was agreed
upon by the Bush White House and congressional leadership, and then
added into newly negotiated FTAs. 155
There were four pending FTAs at the time the New Trade Policy was
adopted-with Peru, Colombia, Panama and South Korea.15 6 Congress has
only voted to implement the Peru FTA, and it insisted the New Trade Policy
be added to the agreement before its passage. 15 7 The Peru FTA's labor
chapter requires that each party "adopt and maintain in its statutes and
regulations, and practices" the rights "as stated in the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998)."158
However, there is a footnote to this requirement that notes, "The obliga-
tions set out in Article 17.2, as they relate to the ILO, refer only to the ILO
Declaration."' 159 Not requiring compliance with the ILO's follow-up proce-
dures means that annual reports, which would document efforts to imple-
ment ILO core conventions, do not have to be filed with the ILO.' 60 As Part
IV will discuss further, this is an important provision for the United States
because the U.S. has not ratified most ILO conventions due to incompati-
bility with U.S. labor law.161
151. See Rangel, supra note 7, at 391.
152. BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 4.
153. A New Trade Policy for America, supra note 12.
154. BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 4.
155. See id.
156. E.g., id.
157. See Gresser, supra note 101, at 497; United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agree-
ment ch. 17, Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/up
loads/agreements/fta/peru/assetuploadfile73_9496.pdf.
158. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 157, art. 17.2. See
infra Part IV for discussion of ILO.
159. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 157, art. 17.2(1)
n.2.
160. See infra Part IV discussing U.S. and ILO conventions.
161. See Gresser, supra note 101, at 497-98.
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The labor provisions in FTAs negotiated in compliance with the New
Trade Policy are fully enforceable through the same dispute settlement
mechanisms and penalties as any other obligations in the agreement. 162
As with all FTAs, dispute resolution for labor violations under the New
Trade Policy resides with the Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tive ("USTR"). 163 To date, no labor dispute has reached the USTR level
under any FTA. 164
IV. The ILO and WTO as Forums for Addressing Worker Protections
Any discussion of the impact that fast track procedures have on
worker protections in free trade agreements necessitates an examination of
what the appropriate forum is for addressing workers' rights. The New
Trade Policy for America, for instance, in its attempt to protect labor,
requires signatory parties to FTAs to comply with the labor requirements
set forth in the ILO Declaration. 1 6 5 The International Labor Organization
and the World Trade Organization have both been suggested as proper
venues for dealing with workers' rights, rather than having labor standards
written into individual FTAs. This Part examines the role of the ILO and
WTO in setting international trade policies on worker protection.
A. The ILO
Currently, the ILO is the international body recognized as having
authority over global labor matters. 166 The ILO is an agency of the United
Nations that is made up of government officials, employers, and workers,
all of whom have an equal voice in labor matters. 16 7 As of February 2010,
183 countries belonged to the ILO. 168 The ILO states that its mission is
"promot[ing] opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and pro-
ductive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dig-
nity."'1 69  In order to accomplish these goals, the ILO develops
international labor standards addressing the full range of issues related to
162. See A New Trade Policy for America, supra note 12.
163. BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 6.
164. Id.
165. A New Trade Policy for America, supra note 12. See infra Part IV.A.2 for a discus-
sion of the ILO Declaration.
166. See About the ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/
global/About -theILO/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
167. See International Labor Organization (ILO), Bureau of International Labor Affairs,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/oir/ilo.htm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
168. See Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries (183 countries), INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
169. See Mission and Objectives, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://wwW.ilo.
org/global/About the ILO/Missionandobjectives/lang-en/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2010).
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workers and their employment conditions. 1 70 These standards can take
the form of a "convention," which is a legally binding international treaty
that requires ratification by member countries, or "recommendations,"
which serve as non-binding guidelines for ILO members. 17 1 ILO represent-
atives can propose conventions and recommendations at the ILO's annual
International Labor Conference ("ILC"). 1 72 Once the ILC adopts a labor
standard, the ILO Constitution requires member nations to submit the
standard to their government for consideration, or in the case of a conven-
tion, for ratification. 173
1. ILO Conventions
The ILO has identified eight conventions as "fundamental."' 174
1. Forced Labour Convention (No. 29)
2. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Conven-
tion (No. 87)
3. Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98)
4. Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100)
5. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (No. 105)
6. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111)
7. Minimum Age Convention (No. 138)
8. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182)
The United States has ratified only two of the ILO's eight core conven-
tions-number 105 covering forced labor and number 182 relating to child
labor.17 5 In addition, the United States is considering Convention 111 on
employment discrimination. 1 76 The United States has not ratified several
conventions because its own labor laws are incompatible with the ILO con-
ventions. 17 7 Five of the ILO's eight core conventions, numbers 29, 87, 98,
100, and 138, are in direct conflict with U.S. law and practice.1 78 For
instance, ratification of numbers 87 and 98, which relate to organizing and
collective bargaining, would require "extensive revisions of longstanding
principles of U.S. labor law."' 179 American laws allow broader exclusions
170. Id. The ILO considers minimum standards of basic labor rights to include free-
dom of association, the right to organize, collective bargaining, abolition of forced labor,
and equality of opportunity and treatment. Id.
171. See Conventions and Recommendations, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/global/What-we do/InternationalLabourStandards/Introduction/
ConventionsandRecommendations/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Adam Greene, U.S. Ratification of ILO Core Labor Standards, U.S. COUNCIL INT'L
Bus. 2 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.uscib.org/docs/USRatification ofILO_
Core Conventions.pdf.
176. Id.
177. See K.D. Raju, Social Clause in VTO and Core ILO Labour Standards: Concerns of
India and Other Developing Countries 11 (Aug. 1, 2008) (unpublished), available at http:/
/ssrn.com/abstractl 195305.
178. See Greene, supra note 175, at 3.
179. Id. See also C87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise
Convention, 1948, http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1948/48BO9-45-engl.pdf (last
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of collective bargaining rights and the right to strike, and several American
states allow the hiring of replacement workers, a practice that is incompati-
ble with the ILO's convention on the right to strike without interference. 180
While critics ask how the U.S. can insist its trading partners abide by ILO
conventions that America itself has not ratified, the United States can point
to the fact that although it has not ratified all of the ILO core conventions,
American laws and practices meet or exceed virtually every ILO
convention. 181
Enforcement of ILO conventions is generally weak. 18 2 In most cases,
countries do not ratify a convention until such time as their laws have
already been made consistent with the convention, which does at least
make it more likely that labor standards are actually being practiced. 183
Nevertheless, after a member nation has ratified an ILO convention, ensur-
ing that the convention is actually followed is not only difficult to verify,
but the ILO has "resisted the notion" of enforcing its conventions. 18 4 The
ILO is not inclined to pursue a strict enforcement policy because it does
not want to drive countries out of the organization simply because these
nations want to avoid expending the resources necessary to come into full
compliance with the conventions. 185 Another driving force behind the
ILO's lax enforcement is the fact that, even in cases where violations are
discovered, the ILO has little recourse against member nations, since the
ILO has no real powers or mechanisms for enforcement. 186
2. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
Since the United States has not ratified all of the ILO conventions, it is
not legally obliged to comply with them.18 7 However, as a member of the
ILO, the U.S. is bound to observe the ILO Declaration, which was adopted
in 1998.188 The ILO Declaration commits all member nations "to respect
and promote principles and rights" in four areas covering workers' rights,
visited Jan. 18, 2011); C98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention,
1949, http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1949/49BO9-88_engl.pdf (last visited Jan.
18, 2011).
180. See Raju, supra note 177, at 11. For a full discussion of how fast-track contrib-
utes to the erosion of federal and states rights, see generally William J. Kovatch, Jr., Left
out of the Game: Fast-Track, Non-Tariff Barriers, and the Erosion of Federalism, 5 ILSA J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 71, 71-91 (1998).
181. See International Labor Organization (ILO), supra note 167.
182. See, e.g., Raju, supra note 177, at 11.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. "[T]he ILO has no police force or labour inspectorate empowered to order a
workplace to be made safer[.]" Anne Trebilcock, ILO Conventions- Enforcement Proce-
dures, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION http://www.ilo.org/safework-bookshelf/
english?content&nd=857170272 (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
187. See Greene, supra note 175, at 2.
188. Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
(une 18, 1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/lang-en/
index.htm.
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"whether or not [countries] have ratified the relevant Conventions."' 18 9
These four areas are freedom of association and recognition of the right to
collective bargaining, elimination of forced labor, abolition of child labor,
and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupa-
tion.190 The commitment to the ILO Declaration includes adherence to a
follow-up procedure, whereby member nations that have not ratified one or
more of the core conventions are asked to make annual reports on "the
status of the relevant rights and principles within their borders."19 1 These
reports are reviewed by a committee of independent expert advisers who
then submit their comments to the ILO's Governing Body for
consideration. 192
Enforcement of the ILO Declaration, as with the ILO conventions, is
limited. The Declaration provides for a "follow-up" whose aim is "to
encourage the efforts made by the Members of the Organization to promote
the fundamental principles and rights enshrined in the Constitution of the
ILO .. .,,193 The ILO will provide assistance to member nations that
require help to implement these fundamental principles and rights, such as
offering "technical cooperation and advisory services" as well as "opera-
tional and budgetary resources" that will help promote the ratification and
implementation of the ILO's conventions. 194 The goal of the ILO is to help
bring nations into compliance with ILO conventions, rather than to punish
them for their inadequacies in enforcing labor standards. 1 9
5
B. The World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization serves as an international forum for
multilateral trade negotiations.' 9 6 Once negotiations are completed and
ratified by member nations, the WTO also administers the agreements and
settles any disputes that arise over compliance with their provisions.
19 7
The WTO states that its main mission is "to help trade flow smoothly,
freely, fairly and predictably."198 The organization "has nearly 150 mem-
bers, accounting for over 97% of world trade."
1 99
189. Id.
190. Id. The New Trade Policy for America requires that FTA countries practice the
labor standards stated in the ILO Declaration. A New Trade Policy for America, supra
note 12.
191. The ILO Declaration, supra note 188. The New Trade Policy has carved out the
follow-up requirement. See supra Part I11.
192. The ILO Declaration, supra note 188.
193. Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Annex 1. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
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195. See id. Annex 1., art. I.
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There is a lack of consensus among WTO members on whether the
WTO, rather than the ILO, is the proper place to establish and enforce
rules on labor.20 0 Currently, labor standards are not subject to WTO rules
and sanctions. 20 1 In fact, at the WTO's 1996 Ministerial meeting in Singa-
pore, it specifically identified the ILO as the proper organization to deal
with labor issues.20 2 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration stated, "We
renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized
core labour standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the
competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our
support for its work in promoting them."' 20 3 The WTO Ministers also
promised that the WTO and ILO Secretariats would continue their
"existing collaboration. '20 4 Although WTO trade agreements have not
heretofore dealt with labor standards, the WTO readily acknowledges the
controversy surrounding the linkage of labor standards and trade.20 5
Several developed countries, including the United States, have sug-
gested that the World Trade Organization is the proper place for establish-
ing a linkage between labor standards and trade. 20 6 The WTO not only
has an elaborate system in place to investigate complaints and settle dis-
putes, but it also permits retaliation for violations of its rules. 20 7 Further,
the WTO wields substantial influence and power over international trade
matters through its multilateral agreements, far surpassing the limited
range of impact of the ILO standards referenced in the FTAs. 20 8
As much as many developed countries want labor issues brought into
the WTO, developing countries do not, out of concern that higher labor
standards will affect the competitive edge they now enjoy with their lower
wage workers. 20 9 Many developing countries also argue that labor stan-
dards proposed by developed countries are too difficult for them to meet at
their current stage of economic development. 2 10 Finally, developing
nations have charged that inserting labor requirements into trade negotia-
200. See DESTLER 1997, supra note 32, at 44.
201. World Trade Organization [WTO], Trade and Labour Standards, http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto e/ministe/min99_e/english/about-e/181ab-e.htm (last visited Jan.
19, 2011).
202. Singapore Ministerial Declaration (Dec. 13, 1996), http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/minist-e/min96_e/wtodece.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2011); DOHA WTO
Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration (Nov. 20, 2001), http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/minist-e/min0le/mindecl-e.htm (reaffirming ILO's role in labor affairs). In
1999, the Seattle Ministerial Conference reached no agreement on the subject. Labour
Standards: Consensus, Coherence and Controversy, supra note 7.
203. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 202.
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205. See Labour Standards: Consensus, Coherence and Controversy, supra note 7.
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207. See Gary Burtless, Workers' Rights: Labor standards and Global Trade, 19 BROOK-
INGS INST. (Fall 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/artices/2001/fall-globaleconomics-
burtless.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2011).
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tions is "little more than a smokescreen for protectionism."'2 11 The Singa-
pore Ministerial Declaration stated, "We reject the use of labour standards
for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of
countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be
put into question."2 12 Notwithstanding this statement, developing coun-
tries fear that they would be pressured to comply with labor standards in
the name of "international coherence," making them hesitant to bring labor
issues into the WTO's regulatory sphere. 2 13
The developing nations have succeeded so far, and labor standards
have not been included in the WTO's latest round of "Doha"2 14 negotia-
tions.2 15 However, as will be discussed in Part V, not only are developed
nations increasingly pushing for a labor and trade linkage, so are non-gov-
ernment organizations and multinational corporations whose customers
want higher labor standards imposed upon nations producing American
imports.21 6
V. Protecting Labor's Interests
Although fast track is not required to negotiate a free trade agreement,
fast track procedures vastly increase the chance that an agreement will
make its way successfully through Congress.2 17 However, labor advocates
have long condemned the fast track mechanism, equating it with the con-
tents of the FTAs that have been implemented under fast track. 218 They
object to the labor provisions in the FTAs, considering them weak and
unenforceable. 2 1 9 Yet, the multilateral trade agreements negotiated in the
WTO, covering the vast majority of world trade, contain no labor provi-
sions whatsoever, and the WTO has made the conscious decision that
there will be no linkage between labor standards and trade. 220 From this
perspective, America's bilateral free trade agreements, which do contain
labor provisions, should be viewed as a real win for pro-labor interests, and
getting the outstanding FTAs through Congress expeditiously should be
the labor community's goal.
In this Part, I argue that labor proponents should not oppose fast track
since, contrary to their insistence, it does provide a viable means for put-
211. Id.
212. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 202.
213. The WTO describes "international coherence" as "the phrase used to describe
efforts to ensure policies move in the same direction." Labour Standards: Consensus,
Coherence and Controversy, supra note 7.
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/www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/ddae.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2011).
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ting forth a labor agenda. I advocate that Congress should reauthorize fast
track authority, as it is an important tool for ensuring the United States
maintains a prominent role in international trade and has a market for its
exports-a market that can potentially create new American jobs. Finally, I
suggest there are more effective means available than FTAs for labor cham-
pions to ensure that all workers have the protections they need.
A. TPA Provides the Opportunity to Promote Labor's Interests
Labor advocates need not fear that fast track will bring about reduced
attention to labor issues in free trade negotiations, as prior trade acts
authorizing TPA have laid out U.S. negotiating objectives that specifically
included labor requirements.2 2 1 In addition, any future TPA that Congress
might authorize would undoubtedly require adherence to the New Trade
Policy, as it was already retroactively added to both the Peru FTA and
KORUS FTA.2 22 Since the New Trade Policy requires observance of the
ILO Declaration's core standards, and obligates governments to effectively
enforce these standards, pro-labor groups have additional assurance that
U.S. trade negotiating objectives will include labor protection.
Opponents of fast track often gloss over the fact that while TPA proce-
dures limit debate and amendments once an implementing bill has reached
Congress, the procedures do not prevent lobbyists, politicians, and even
labor unions from providing input to FTAs during other stages of the pro-
cess. 223 For example, the United Auto Workers Union ("UAW") reversed
its original position opposing the KORUS FTA after the union received the
opportunity to discuss the problems it had with certain terms of the agree-
ment.224 In explaining the UAW's reasons for ultimately supporting
KORUS, even though it meant breaking ranks with virtually all of
America's organized labor, the UAW's president noted, "[T]he UAW was
consulted and played a meaningful role in the negotiations and was able to
successfully influence the process and secure significant improvements to
the automotive provisions in the trade agreement. '2 25 Fast track did not
prevent the UAW from expressing its concerns about the KORUS FTA
before the implementing legislation reached Congress for approval-it only
dictated the timing and forum for the union's input.
Admittedly, the opportunity extended to the UAW for making com-
ments is not altogether commonplace in American trade negotiations. In
announcing the Obama Administration's 2010 Trade Policy Agenda, USTR
Ron Kirk frankly acknowledged that the Administration has not ade-
quately addressed the concerns of all its constituencies when negotiating
221. See BOLLE RL 33864, supra note 53, at 5.
222. See BOLLE RS 22823, supra note 10, at 3.
223. See HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 3, at 9-10; VanGrasstek, supra note 29, at 4.
224. See United Auto Workers Union [UAW], More on 2010 KORUS Trade Deal (Dec.
15, 2010), http://www.uaw.org/articles/more-2010-korus-trade-deal.
225. Id.; Maggs, supra note 2.
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past trade agreements. 2 26 However, in reiterating the importance of FTAs
to the United States, Kirk asserted that in the future, the USTR's Office
would consult more often with both Congress and the general public, in an
effort to incorporate what stakeholders want included in a particular
FTA.22 7 Kirk noted,
The Administration continues to believe that proper resolution and imple-
mentation of Free Trade Agreements with Panama, Colombia and Korea can
bring significant economic and strategic benefits. However, there have been
serious questions in America about some aspects of these pending pacts.
Rather than brush these questions aside, we conducted extensive consulta-
tions with Congress, stakeholders, and the public on the pending Agree-
ments, including a Federal Register Notice on Colombia and Korea to more
precisely identify issues.2 28
Since the Obama Administration has stated that it is interested in
hearing the positions of all the stakeholders in FTAs, the political climate
today seems perfect for addressing a new authorization of TPA. With the
willingness to entertain all viewpoints that the Obama Administration has
expressed, members of Congress would have ample opportunity to make
their wishes known concerning what they want to be included in a new
TPA legislation's negotiating objectives. Congressional representatives are
very aware of the need to satisfy their constituents, and labor has always
been a powerful political force. However, satisfying labor's agenda in a
trade bill is not an impossible task, given Congress's ability to frame the
precise language of trade negotiating objectives. 229 If strong labor stan-
dards are written directly into a new trade bill to reauthorize fast track,
Congress would have the opportunity to show its labor base that it is still
very sensitive to labor's best interests. The time for Congress to reject
objectionable aspects of fast track authority is when the Trade Act authoriz-
ing TPA is being put together, not when an individual FTA is up for a vote.
This is the only way that the negative association between fast track and
FTAs will ever be broken.
Labor advocates must rethink their position on fast track and support
renewal of TPA as a means of expanding the U.S. export market. If crafted
with due deliberation, TPA legislation can ensure there is labor protection
for both American workers and those workers employed by our trading
partners, thereby meeting the dual economic and humanitarian goals of
the labor community. 23 0 As will be discussed in the next section, absent
TPA, the U.S. is currently not undertaking any new free trade agreement
negotiations. As a result, the U.S. is already falling behind other nations in
international trade, a trend that economists believe will ultimately cost the
226. See RON KIRK, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE PRESIDENT'S 2010 TRADE
POLICY AGENDA 10 (2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/1673.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See supra Part II (discussing the congressional role in FTA creation).
230. See supra Part III (discussing goals of labor protection).
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U.S. a significant number of jobs.2 3 '
B. TPA Renewal Can Improve U.S. Export Capacity and Stem American
Job Losses
Based on historical experience, the President needs TPA to ensure pas-
sage of the pending FTAs with South Korea, Panama, and Colombia, as well
as any other trade deals the U.S. wants to negotiate, including the Doha
Round. 23 2 Leading economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati, a professor at
Columbia University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations,
believe that TPA is "a prerequisite" for trade negotiations, and without it,
the United States will be "losers in the world trade system."'23 3
There is already evidence that world trade has started to pass the U.S.
by, as other more trade-friendly nations enter into their own FTAs. 23 4 For
example, Canada has entered into FTAs with both Colombia and Panama,
causing U.S. wheat exporters great concern as they anticipate American
market share will "decline precipitously" in South America as a result.235
The European Union has similarly entered into FTAs with Colombia, Peru,
Panama, and other Central American countries. 236 Although there are
approximately 100 trade agreements currently under negotiation around
the world, the U.S. is only party to one.23 7 Considering that the U.S. has
always been a leader in world trade, having international trade negotiations
virtually at a standstill is a sign that something needs to change. I submit
that the change needed is immediate reauthorization of the President's fast
track authority, so that FTA negotiations with potential new trading part-
ners can begin.
According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, "overseas markets
represent 73% of the world's purchasing power, 87% of its economic
growth, and 95% of its consumers."238 The U.S. needs access to these
overseas markets in order to stimulate the economy by generating more
jobs. In his January 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama set
a goal of doubling American exports over the next five years, which he
231. See GABRIEL H. SAHLGREN, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE UNITED STATES-SOUTH
KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 6 (2007), available at http://cei.org/pdf/6189.pdf.
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tiate if Congress can amend an FTA. See id.
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claimed could potentially result in two million jobs.23 9 To capitalize on the
export market, however, the U.S. must improve its tariff exposure with
other nations. The World Economic Forum ranks the United States 114
out of 121 economies in terms of the tariffs U.S. exporters face when ship-
ping their goods overseas. 240 FTAs are a proven way to lower or eliminate
tariffs and therefore make foreign markets riper for American products.
Yet without fast track, the prospects of new free trade agreements being
passed are very slim.
Labor and its allies must reverse their longstanding position against
FTAs and support the fast track legislation the President needs to get
America's economy going again. In a May 2010 Chamber of Commerce
study that looked at how FTAs with 14 countries benefited U.S. workers
and companies over the past 25 years, researchers found that 17.7 million
American jobs depended on trade with these partner countries. 24 1 The
study also found that in the ten years from 1998 to 2008, U.S. exports to
FTA trading partners increased almost three times faster than did U.S.
exports to non-partners. 24 2 These findings show that American labor does
not lose footing when the U.S. engages in free trade, despite rhetoric to the
contrary.2 43
Blocking fast track will not improve the lot of workers. It will simply
delay the passage of FTAs that, in the long run, could benefit workers by
creating jobs. Another reality that organized labor and its backers must
recognize is that, given how few FTAs there are, and how few of America's
trading partners they encompass, free trade agreements may not be a par-
ticularly effective means for bringing about widespread international labor
reform.24 4 Although the U.S. government has traditionally used free trade
agreements to create a linkage between labor and trade, as will be dis-
cussed, private industry has succeeded in finding other effective means for
imposing labor standards on the nations with which America trades. The
energy that organized labor expends campaigning against passage of a new
TPA should instead be used to support the industry-initiated labor protec-
tion programs described below.
C. Proponents Have Better Means than FTAs to Promote Labor
Standards
Linking trade and worker protections reflects what the public wants
both in the U.S. and abroad. Americans want countries that take part in
239. See Helene Cooper, Obama Sets Ambitious Export Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010,
at B1; Rowland, supra note 5.
240. E.g., MURPHY, supra note 235, at 2.
241. MURPHY, supra note 235, at 3 (citing U.S. CHAMBER COMMERCE, OPENING MARKETS,
CREATING JOBS: ESTIMATED U.S. EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF TRADE WITH FTA PARTNERS 10
(2010), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/100514_fta
jobs full 0.pdf.
242. Id.
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244. See Gresser, supra note 101, at 502, 515.
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international trade agreements to maintain minimum standards for work-
ers. 245 Polls in other nations, such as China, Mexico, and India, reveal the
same support for including labor standards in trade agreements. 246 How-
ever, trade agreements are not the only way to bring about improved labor
conditions for workers. As a result of the public's increased attention to
labor issues, many multinational companies have established voluntary
business codes and factory inspection protocols that offer workers far more
protection than they receive through the labor provisions of FTAs. 247 Two
decades ago, when FTAs such as NAFTA were first signed, most businesses
viewed labor standards as a government issue.248 Today, however, it has
become commonplace for companies to establish codes of conduct and
labor standards for their international suppliers. 24 9 Levi Strauss, Reebok,
Starbucks, Sears, JCPenney, and Home Depot are among the many compa-
nies that require their overseas producers to meet company labor stan-
dards, regardless of local labor laws. 250
The provisions of corporate conduct codes are quite similar to the
labor stipulations of U.S. FTAs. 25 1 Similar to the labor provisions in FTAs,
the codes also serve dual purposes. In most cases, corporations that estab-
lish voluntary business codes do so for humanitarian reasons, but they
also do so for "self-interested reasons. ' 25 2 Brand name and company
image are important commodities, and support for labor rights helps a
company avoid offending socially conscious consumers. 253 A compelling
illustration of what can happen when consumers become aware of labor
abuses in overseas factories is the successful campaign that took place
against apparel bearing the Kathie Lee Gifford logo, hurting the company's
bottom line and tarnishing Kathie Lee Gifford's name.2 54 Similar cam-
paigns have taken place against Nike, Gap, Wal-Mart, and Disney, as con-
sumer watchdog groups publicized reports of abusive labor conditions in
these companies' manufacturing facilities overseas. 255
A further indication that the marketplace, rather than trade agree-
ments, may be a better place to forge labor protections can be found in the
example of the apparel industry's corporate codes. 256 The apparel codes
245. See, e.g., Destler 2007, supra note 34, at 7.
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India. Id.
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248. See Gresser, supra note 101, at 520-521.
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(1995).
250. See id. at 686; Gresser, supra note 101, at 521.
251. See Gresser, supra note 101, at 524.
252. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrre, supra note 249, at 669; Gresser, supra
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provide more extensive coverage than FTAs, as they contain wage and
safety measures, require adherence to the ILO Declaration, and call for fac-
tory inspections that are more comprehensive than those required by the
ILO or the U.S. government. 25 7 There are similar codes of conduct gov-
erning workers' rights in other industries as well, including toys, cosmetics,
and food.25 8 Estimates are that business expenditures to ensure compli-
ance with labor codes internationally actually exceed the amount spent by
the U.S. Department of Labor and closely approach the annual budget of
the ILO. 259
Private sector codes have some definite advantages over government
imposed standards. For one thing, the codes apply to all countries where a
company does business, not just those who are formal American trading
partners through a free trade agreement. 260 Additionally, by using private
codes, labor violations are generally detected sooner, since companies per-
form regular factory inspections. 2 6 1 Enforcement is also more immediate
and pronounced, as a company can quickly withdraw orders as a sanction
for labor violations. 26 2
Another advantage of private codes is that governments are not the
only parties able to take action for labor violations, making it much more
likely that infractions will be reported. 2 63 As noted in the earlier discus-
sion of the weak enforcement mechanism of the NAALC, and the Jordan
FTA's side letter that essentially nullified the agreement's trade sanctions,
governments do not want to take actions against other governments, ren-
dering most of the labor provisions in FTAs useless. 2 6 4 Leaving govern-
ments out of the enforcement process allows for flexibility in the terms of
the codes that might otherwise be unavailable. The United States, as a
member of the ILO and WTO, has certain trade obligations that constrain
its free trade policies.265 As a result, the U.S. can only go so far in its FTA
negotiations without running afoul of other international rules.2 6 6 Negoti-
ations over aspects of FTAs, including labor enforcement, can suffer due to
WTO limitations in terms of what the U.S. can demand of its trading part-
ners.2 67 Corporate codes, on the other hand, because they are established
between private entities, have no such constraints, allowing companies a
free hand in deciding on sanctions and penalties for labor violations.
Some of the seeming advantages of corporate codes also present corre-
sponding disadvantages, however. For one thing, because corporate codes
257. See id. at 521-522.
258. See Compa, supra note 254, at 211.
259. Gresser, supra note 101, at 523. The U.S. Department of Labor spent $81 mil-
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267. See id. at 510.
Cornell International Law Journal
are private and voluntary, they do not have the same legal standing as labor
provisions agreed upon between governments in FTAs. 268 Labor standards
enumerated in a free trade agreement bind all of a country's industries
equally. Studies have found that codes of conduct and inspection proto-
cols work far better in certain sectors, such as apparel and footwear manu-
facturing, than they do in other industries, such as agriculture or those
involving natural resources. 26 9 Without local government regulation or
standards imposed by the labor provisions of trade agreements, protection
for workers in some industries could remain weak or non-existent. How-
ever, since there are so many human rights groups, religious organizations,
and members of the labor community advocating for increased implemen-
tation of corporate codes, it should only be a matter of time before the
codes become more effective across all industries. 270
Another potential problem with corporate codes that bears considera-
tion is that self-monitoring allows a company to control the level of enforce-
ment to which it subjects its suppliers, much the same way that labor
provisions in FTAs allow American trading partners to determine the
extent to which they will enforce their own labor laws. Although compa-
nies may establish a public image of responsibility to meet the expecta-
tions of their customers and shareholders, what really goes on behind
factory doors is still a private matter.
There are enough companies that have taken concrete action out of
genuine concern for their workers that voluntary corporate codes must be
viewed as a better alternative to the labor standards established through
free trade agreements. As noted above, business codes are more flexible
than FTA provisions and cover more issues. Corporations can move swiftly
to impose sanctions when there are labor violations, unencumbered by the
political and regulatory constraints governments face. Finally, and most
importantly, corporate codes have proven themselves effective in bringing
about better wages and working conditions, as companies endeavor to
ensure their labor practices do not offend consumers and hurt their bot-
tom line. Successful consumer boycotts have made multinational corpora-
tions all too aware of what can happen if they do not enforce an
appropriate level of labor standards in their factories. In contrast, not a
single labor infraction under the provisions of any U.S. FTA has ever been
reported to the Office of the USTR for resolution, bearing out the labor
community's claims of the weaknesses in FTA enforcement capabilities.2 7 1
Congress should reauthorize fast track as a means of trade expansion
and job creation, and it should include labor requirements in the TPA legis-
lation's negotiating objectives. However, labor proponents should look
beyond FTA labor provisions to business codes of conduct for better assur-
268. See id. at 525.
269. See id. at 524.
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ance that workers will be protected both in the United States and in our
trading partners.
Conclusion
For more than three decades, fast track procedures have been used to
negotiate free trade agreements. Yet the labor community and its friends in
Congress still object to fast track, equating it with the FTAs fast track has
helped to pass. Labor advocates contend that FTAs have led to job losses in
the United States and degradation of labor standards in our international
trading partners. While FTAs do include some iteration of labor standards,
labor champions argue that the standards are not only ineffective, but .they
are not even enforced.
Fast track is not required to negotiate a free trade agreement, but its
strict rules on congressional debate and amendments vastly improve the
chance that an agreement will be passed. It is these very requirements,
however, that have caused much of the criticism over fast track procedures.
Labor advocates believe that they have not been given a meaningful oppor-
tunity to voice their opinion on the contents of trade agreements, which
they believe has led to inadequate protections for both American workers
and the laborers of our trading partners. The Obama Administration's
announcement that it will consider the views of all stakeholders when
negotiating future FTAs, and its recent consideration of the United Auto
Workers' comments on the KORUS FTA, may finally put an end to con-
cerns that there is no vehicle for labor's input into FTAs.
Labor proponents deserve credit for trying to establish working stan-
dards that all Americans can be proud of. However, they need not fear that
reauthorizing fast track will weaken labor protections in FTAs. Previous
versions of TPA have included negotiating objectives favorable to labor, and
there is no reason why future TPAs would not similarly do so. Nevertheless,
with such strong misgivings over the effectiveness of FTA labor enforce-
ment, labor groups must consider that FTA provisions may no longer be
the best means for achieving worker protections. Times have changed
since the inception of fast track in 1974. Today, many multinational corpo-
rations have established voluntary codes of conduct that have proven far
more effective in raising labor standards than have FTAs. Labor's cause
might be better served if it joined with industry groups to further develop
corporate conduct codes.
The President's fast track authority expired in 2007 and has not been
renewed. Most trade experts believe the President needs TPA, since other
nations will not want to negotiate trade agreements with the U.S. if they
have no assurance that what they agree to at the negotiating table will
make it through Congress unchanged. The U.S. has commenced no new
FTA negotiations since fast track expired, although many other nations
have done so, putting into jeopardy America's prominence in world trade.
FTAs have the potential to open up world markets and generate new jobs,
both in America and overseas. At this juncture, opposing a reauthorization
of TPA would not be in labor's best interests.

